A close-up photograph of a red brick wall with light-colored mortar joints. The bricks are arranged in a standard running bond pattern. The lighting is even, highlighting the texture of the bricks and the mortar.

Wittgenstein

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Ogden translation

1. The world is everything that is the case.
2. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.
3. The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
4. The thought is the significant proposition.
5. Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)
6. The general form of truth-function is $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$.
This is the general form of proposition.
7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.

Pears/McGuinness translation

- The world is all that is the case.
What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
A logical picture of facts is a thought.
A thought is a proposition with sense.
A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)
The general form of a truth-function is $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$.
This is the general form of a proposition.
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

- 1* The world is all that is the case.
- 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
- 1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.
- 1.12 For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.
- 1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
- 1.2 The world divides into facts.
- 1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.

- 2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
- 2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).
- 2.0122 Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with states of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear in two different rôles: by themselves, and in propositions.)
- 2.013 Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs. This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space.
- 2.014 Objects contain the possibility of all situations.
- 2.0141 The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object.

- 2.02 Objects are simple.
- 2.0201 Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely.
- 2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite.
- 2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.
- 2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false).

- 2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.
- 2.03 In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain.
- 2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.
- 2.032 The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs.
- 2.033 Form is the possibility of structure.
- 2.05 The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.
- 2.06 The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.

(We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative fact.)

- 2.1 We picture facts to ourselves.
- 2.11 A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
- 2.12 A picture is a model of reality.
- 2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.
- 2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects.
- 2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.

- 2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.
- 2.1511 That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.
- 2.1512 It is laid against reality like a measure.
- 2.16 If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts
- 2.161 There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all.
- 2.17 What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way it does, is its pictorial form.

- 2.172 A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it.
- 2.173 A picture represents its subject from a position outside it. (Its standpoint is its representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly.

- 2.181 A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture.
- 2.182 Every picture is at the same time a logical one. (On the other hand, not every picture is, for example, a spatial one.)
- 2.19 Logical pictures can depict the world.
- 2.2 A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts.
- 2.202 A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.
- 2.203 A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.
- 2.21 A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.

- 2.221 What a picture represents is its sense.
- 2.222 The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.
- 2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
- 2.224 It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
- 2.225 There are no pictures that are true a priori.

- 3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.
- 3.001 'A state of affairs is thinkable': what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves.
- 3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.
- 3.02 A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is the thought. What is thinkable is possible too.

- 3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.
- 3.11 We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation.
The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition.
- 3.12 I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign.—And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.
- 3.2 In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought.

- 3.202 The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.
- 3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('A' is the same sign as 'A'.)
- 3.21 The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign.
- 3.22 In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.

- 3.25 A proposition has one and only one complete analysis.
- 3.251 What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate.
- 3.26 A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign.

4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.

4.001 The totality of propositions is language.

4.002 Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is—just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.

Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.

It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.

The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated.

4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.

(They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful.)

And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all.

4.003 1 All philosophy is a 'critique of language' (though not in Mauthner's sense). It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one.

6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.

If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.

It must lie outside the world.

6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.

Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

6.42 1

It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.

Ethics is transcendental.

(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

6.45 To view the world *sub specie aeterni* is to view it as a whole—a limited whole.

Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.

6.5 When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words.

The riddle does not exist.

If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it.

6.52 We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.

6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.

(Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that sense?)

6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.

6.53

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.

6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)


He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN
PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS

The German Text, with a Revised English Translation

50TH ANNIVERSARY
50
COMMEMORATIVE EDITION



 Blackwell

The narrowness of the philosophical conception of meaning

§2: "That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But we can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours."

The narrowness of the philosophical conception of meaning

§23: It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.)

Linguistic expressions are superficially similar but serve radically different kinds of functions.

§4: "Imagine a script in which the letters were used to stand for sounds, and also as signs of emphasis and punctuation. (A script can be conceived as a language for describing sound-patterns.) Now imagine someone interpreting that script as if there were simply a correspondence of letters to sounds and as if the letters had not also completely different functions. Augustine's conception of language is like such an over-simple conception of the script."

Linguistic expressions are superficially similar but serve radically different kinds of functions.

§12: "It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. We see handles all looking more or less alike. (Naturally, since they are all supposed to be handled.) But one is the handle of a crank which can be moved continuously (it regulates the opening of a valve); another is the handle of a switch, which has only two effective positions, it is either off or on; a third is the handle of a brake-lever, the harder one pulls on it, the harder it brakes; a fourth, the handle of a pump: it has an effect only so long as it is moved to and fro."

Meaning as Use

§1: [following a description of sending someone shopping with a slip marked "five red apples"]

"But what is the meaning of the word "five"?—
No such thing was in question here, only how
the word "five" is used."

Meaning as Use

§10: "Now what do the words of this language *signify*?—What is supposed to shew what they signify, if not the kind of use they have?"

Forms of Life

§19: "It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle.—Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others.—— And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."

Language Games

§7: "We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games "language-games" and will some-times speak of a primitive language as a language-game.

And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.

I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game". "

Language Games

§21: “Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports the number of slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colours and shapes of the building-stones that are stacked in such-and-such a place.—Such a report might run: “Five slabs”. Now what is the difference between the report or statement “Five slabs” and the order “Five slabs!”?— Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language-game.”

Language Games

§18: “Do not be troubled by the fact that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If you want to say that this shews them to be incomplete, ask yourself whether our language is complete;—whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.”

Language Games

§21: “Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports the number of slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colours and shapes of the building-stones that are stacked in such-and-such a place.—Such a report might run: “Five slabs”. Now what is the difference between the report or statement “Five slabs” and the order “Five slabs!”?— Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language-game.”

Language Games

§21: “Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:

Giving orders, and obeying them—

Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—

Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—

Reporting an event—

Speculating about an event—

Language Games

§21:

Forming and testing a hypothesis—

Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—

Making up a story; and reading it—

Play-acting—

Singing catches—

Guessing riddles—

Making a joke; telling it—

Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—

Translating from one language into another—

Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.



J.L. Austin

Not only when doing philosophy, but even in the most casual conversation, Austin spoke and thought with great precision, and he did not tolerate looseness in his students or colleagues. The worst condemnation that he could make of something he was reading would be to shake his head sadly and say in his thin, precise way, "It's just loose." Indeed, on several occasions he said to me in tones more of sadness than anger, "There is a lot loose thinking in this town."

—John Searle

...he did not join at any time in the general deference to Wittgenstein. The personal atmosphere surrounding Wittgenstein's work strongly repelled him; and it is of course crucial also that Wittgenstein rejected, deliberately and on principle, exactly that ideal of finality, of definite, clearly and fully stated solutions, which Austin regarded as alone worth seriously striving for. That Wittgenstein influenced his views has been sometimes suggested, but is certainly untrue.

—Geoffrey Warnock on Austin

In the course of our conversation, I let it be known that I thought words were tools, with manifold uses. Austin said, 'Let's see what Witters has to say about that', and he reached for his copy of the *Philosophical Investigations*. He read, among others, section 23, where Wittgenstein lists some of the uses of language—giving orders, speculating about an event, play-acting, making a joke, and so on. Austin remarked that these things are all quite different, and can't just be lumped together like that. He then expressed doubts about the tool-hood of words: 'Are you quite sure that "tool" is the right word? Mightn't they be more like something else—utensils, for example?' He suggested that we try to determine what the various possibilities were; accordingly, he leafed through the Concise Oxford Dictionary picking out candidates, while I wrote them down. My list contained about thirty words, including 'appliance', 'apparatus', 'utensil', 'implement', 'contrivance', 'instrument', 'tool', 'machine', 'gadget', 'contraption', 'piece of equipment', 'mechanism', 'device', and 'gimmick'. I seem to remember that 'gewgaw' even had a half-serious day in court. We tried to think of examples of each of these, and to determine what the important differences amongst them were. I think we decided that words were probably more like instruments than anything else on the list.

—George Pitcher, on meeting with Austin at Harvard in 1955

Key Themes, Austin:

- Shares W.'s interest in the many uses of language that an overt focus on truth conditions and verification leaves out.
- Thinks W. is too “loose”; wants to say something more systematic about the things we do with language.

J. L. AUSTIN



How to do
things
with Words

*The William James Lectures
delivered in Harvard University
in 1955*

EDITED BY


J. O. URMSON

HTW, pp.2-3


Three stages of recent trends in philosophical thinking about language:

1. An idealized conception of language as consisting of declarative sentences and as being used only to make true or false statements.
2. The idea that some purported statements are actually nonsensical for reasons that aren't obviously grammatical.
3. The idea that language—including declarative sentences—has perfectly good, and not nonsensical uses other than making statements.

1



FREGE



RUSSELL


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WITTGENSTEIN



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


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
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WITTGENSTEIN AGAIN



STEVENSON



HARE



AUSTIN

“Certainly there are a great many uses of language. It's rather a pity that people are apt to invoke a new use of language whenever they feel so inclined, to help them out of this, that, or the other well-known philosophical tangle; we need more of a framework in which to discuss these uses of language; and also I think we should not despair too easily and talk, as people are apt to do, about the *infinite* uses of language. Philosophers will do this when they have listed as many, let us say, as seventeen; but even if there were something like ten thousand uses of language, surely we could list them all in time. This, after all, is no larger than the number of species of beetle that entomologists have taken the pains to list.”

—Austin, p.121

Wittgenstein, *PI*, §23:

1. Giving orders, and obeying them—
2. Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements
3. Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
4. Reporting an event—
5. Speculating about an event—
6. Forming and testing a hypothesis—
7. Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams
8. Making up a story;
9. and reading it—
10. Play-acting—
11. Singing catches—
12. Guessing riddles—
13. Making a joke;
14. telling it—
15. Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
16. Translating from one language into another—
17. Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

Lecture 1

Performative Utterances vs. Constative Utterances

Examples:

- (E. *a*) ‘I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)’—as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.²
- (E. *b*) ‘I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*’—as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem.
- (E. *c*) ‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’—as occurring in a will.
- (E. *d*) ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.’

What are we to call a sentence or an utterance of this type?² I propose to call it a *performative sentence* or a performative utterance, or, for short, ‘a performative’.

² ‘Sentences’ form a class of ‘utterances’, which class is to be defined, so far as I am concerned, grammatically, though I doubt if the definition has yet been given satisfactorily. With performative utterances are contrasted, for example and essentially, ‘constative’ utterances: to issue a constative utterance (i.e. to utter it with a historical reference) is to make a statement. To issue a performative utterance is, for example, to make a bet. See further below on ‘illocutions’.

pp.9-10

Performatives are not “merely the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for information, of an inward and spiritual act...”

“Accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that *our word is our bond.*”

Lectures 2-4

Felicity Conditions and the varieties of Infelicity



Global

Categories of Felicity Condition


- (A. 1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,
- (A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.
- (B. 1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and
- (B. 2) completely.

Categories of Felicity Condition

- (*F. 1*) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves,¹ and further
- (*F. 2*) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

Kinds of Infelicity

Infelicities



Some Key Points:

- If an act is infelicitous in A or B ways, then it is not the act it purports to be at all, whereas Γ -type infelicities don't cancel the act, but merely make it an abuse.
- Austin is a conventionalist: what matters for the performance of a speech act is that the speaker acts according to conventions. The speaker's mental states are of secondary concern.
- Performatives are a species within the genus of conventional acts/procedures more generally.
- Even statements have felicity conditions.
- Performatives needn't be explicit, they can also be implicit.

Lectures 5-7

Guiding Questions:

Is the constative-performative distinction a legitimate and useful one?

Is there even a good way to draw it?