John Searle
*Speech Acts*
Objections to Intentionalism

1. Grice doesn’t place enough emphasis on the requirements of linguistic convention (44–45)

2. Some illocutionary acts are not intended to produce perlocutionary effects (e.g., greeting, stating, predicting, promising, etc.)
Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen blühen?
Constitutive vs. Regulative Rules
Searle’s theory of Promising

Given that a speaker S utters a sentence T in the presence of a hearer H, then, in the utterance of T, S sincerely (and non-defectively) promises that p to H if and only if:

(1) Normal input and output conditions obtain.
Searle’s theory of Promising

Given that a speaker S utters a sentence T in the presence of a hearer H, then, in the utterance of T, S sincerely (and non-defectively) promises that p to H if and only if:

Propositional Content Conditions:

(2) S expresses that p in the utterance of T.
(3) In expressing that p, S predicates a future act A of S.
Searle’s theory of Promising

Given that a speaker S utters a sentence T in the presence of a hearer H, then, in the utterance of T, S sincerely (and non-defectively) promises that p to H if and only if:

Preparatory Conditions:

(4) H would prefer S’s doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would prefer his doing A to his not doing A.

(5) It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events.
Searle’s theory of Promising

Given that a speaker S utters a sentence T in the presence of a hearer H, then, in the utterance of T, S sincerely (and non-defectively) promises that p to H if and only if:

**Sincerity Condition**

(6) S intends to do A.

(6)a. S intends that the utterance of T will make him responsible for intending to do A.
Searle’s theory of Promising

Given that a speaker S utters a sentence T in the presence of a hearer H, then, in the utterance of T, S sincerely (and non-defectively) promises that p to H if and only if:

**Essential Condition**

(7) S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to do A.
Searle’s theory of Promising

Given that a speaker S utters a sentence T in the presence of a hearer H, then, in the utterance of T, S sincerely (and non-defectively) promises that p to H if and only if:

(Communicative Condition)

(8) S intends (i-1) to produce in H the knowledge (K) that the utterance of T is to count as placing S under an obligation to do A. S intends to produce K by means of the recognition of i-1, and he intends i-1 to be recognized in virtue of (by means of) H’s knowledge of the meaning of T.
Searle’s theory of Promising

Given that a speaker S utters a sentence T in the presence of a hearer H, then, in the utterance of T, S sincerely (and non-defectively) promises that p to H if and only if:

(Semantic Condition)

(9) The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by S and H are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions (1)-(8) obtain.
### Types of illocutionary act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of rule</th>
<th>Preparatory</th>
<th>Sincerity</th>
<th>Essential</th>
<th>Comment:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propositional content</td>
<td>Future act $A$ of $H$.</td>
<td>$S$ wants $H$ to do $A$.</td>
<td>Counts as an attempt to get $H$ to do $A$.</td>
<td><em>Order</em> and <em>command</em> have the additional preparatory rule that $S$ must be in a position of authority over $H$. <em>Command</em> probably does not have the 'pragmatic' condition requiring non-obviousness. Furthermore in both, the authority relationship infects the essential condition because the utterance counts as an attempt to get $H$ to do $A$ in virtue of the authority of $S$ over $H$.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>$H$ is able to do $A$. $S$ believes $H$ is able to do $A$.</td>
<td>$S$ has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of $p$.</td>
<td>$S$ knows (does not need to be reminded of, etc.) $p$.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. It is not obvious to both $S$ and $H$ that $H$ will do $A$ in the normal course of events of his own accord.</td>
<td>2. It is not obvious to both $S$ and $H$ that $H$ knows (does not need to be reminded of, etc.) $p$.</td>
<td>Unlike <em>argue</em> these do not seem to be essentially tied to attempting to convince. Thus &quot;I am simply stating that $p$ and not attempting to convince you&quot; is acceptable, but &quot;I am arguing that $p$ and not attempting to convince you&quot; sounds inconsistent.</td>
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Question

Any proposition or propositional function.

1. $S$ does not know 'the answer', i.e., does not know if the proposition is true, or, in the case of the propositional function, does not know the information needed to complete the proposition truly (but see comment below).

2. It is not obvious to both $S$ and $H$ that $H$ will provide the information at that time without being asked.

$S$ wants this information.

Counts as an attempt to elicit this information from $H$.

Comment:

There are two kinds of questions, (a) real questions, (b) exam questions. In real questions $S$ wants to know (find out) the answer; in exam questions, $S$ wants to know if $H$ knows.
Thank (for)

Propositional content
Preparatory

Past act $A$ done by $H$.

$A$ benefits $S$ and $S$ believes $A$ benefits $S$.

Types of rule

Sincerity

$S$ feels grateful or appreciative for $A$.

Essential

Counts as an expression of gratitude or appreciation.

Comment:

Sincerity and essential rules overlap. Thanking is just expressing gratitude in a way that, e.g., promising is not just expressing an intention.
Advising

**Propositional content**

Future act $A$ of $H$.

**Preparatory**

1. $H$ has some reason to believe $A$ will benefit $H$.
2. It is not obvious to both $S$ and $H$ that $H$ will do $A$ in the normal course of events.

**Types of rule**

**Sincerity**

$S$ believes $A$ will benefit $H$.

**Essential**

Counts as an undertaking to the effect that $A$ is in $H$’s best interest.

**Comment:**

Contrary to what one might suppose advice is not a species of requesting. It is interesting to compare “advise” with “urge”, “advocate” and “recommend”.

Advising you is not trying to get you to do something in the sense that requesting is. Advising is more like telling you what is best for you.
**Warn**

**Propositional content**

future event or state, etc., $E$.

**Preparatory**

1. $H$ has reason to believe $E$ will occur and is not in $H$’s interest.
2. It is not obvious to both $S$ and $H$ that $E$ will occur.

**Types of rule**

**Sincerity**

$S$ believes $E$ is not in $H$’s best interest.

**Essential**

Counts as an undertaking to the effect that $E$ is not in $H$’s best interest.

**Comment:**

Warning is like advising, rather than requesting. It is not, I think, necessarily an attempt to get you to take evasive action. Notice that the above account is of categorical not hypothetical warnings. Most warnings are probably hypothetical: “If you do not do $X$ then $Y$ will occur.”
**Warn**

**Propositional content**

Future event or state, etc., $E$.

**Preparatory**

1. $H$ has reason to believe $E$ will occur and is not in $H$’s interest.
2. It is not obvious to both $S$ and $H$ that $E$ will occur.

**Types of rule**

**Sincerity**

$S$ believes $E$ is not in $H$’s best interest.

**Essential**

Counts as an undertaking to the effect that $E$ is not in $H$’s best interest.

**Comment:**

Warning is like advising, rather than requesting. It is not, I think, necessarily an attempt to get you to take evasive action. Notice that the above account is of categorical not hypothetical warnings. Most warnings are probably hypothetical: “If you do not do $X$ then $Y$ will occur.”
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<td>Greet</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>$S$ has just encountered (or been introduced to, etc.) $H$.</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>Counts as courteous recognition of $H$ by $S$.</td>
</tr>
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**Types of rule**

- Propositional content
- Preparatory
- Sincerity
- Essential

**Propositional content**

Some event, act, etc., $E$ related to $H$.

**Preparatory**

$E$ is in $H$’s interest and $S$ believes $E$ is in $H$’s interest.

**Sincerity**

$S$ is pleased at $E$.

**Essential**

Counts as an expression of pleasure at $E$.

**Comment:**

“Congratulate” is similar to “thank” in that it is an expression of its sincerity condition.