In the first section of this chapter, we were left with a certain ambiguity in Austin's characterization of locutionary acts, as exemplified by the phrase, "uttering a sentence with a certain sense and reference." At L2 of the schema, what $S$ means by $e$ is one of the meanings of $e$ in $L$, as specified at L1(a). At this stage uttering $e$ with a certain sense and reference is merely to intend a certain one of its meanings to be operative and for the referents of its referring expressions to be delimited accordingly. Nothing is yet entailed about what the speaker is saying, which is represented by L3. Only there is it inferred what $S$ is referring to, generally in a way much more determinate than the way referring expressions refer (as a consequence of their senses). So we can resolve the ambiguity in Austin's formulation by letting locutionary acts be represented by L3. Whatever else fits his ambiguous characterizations falls under earlier steps or substeps of the SAS and consequently gets accounted for without being included in the locutionary act itself.[11]

Certain philosophical and linguistic issues remain. For instance, what are the different types of meaning alluded to in the steps from L1 to L2, and how are they to be specified? What is the nature of such phenomena as implication and presupposition, which are closely connected to what is said but are not part of what is said? These issues will be taken up in chapter 8. In the next chapter we develop our taxonomy of communicative illocutionary acts.

## Chapter Three

## A Taxonomy of Communicative Illocutionary Acts

Types of illocutionary acts are distinguished by types of illocutionary intents (intended illocutionary effects). Since illocutionary intents are fulfilled if the hearer recognizes the attitudes expressed by the speaker, types of illocutionary intents correspond to types of expressed attitudes. Accordingly, we will classify types of illocutionary acts in terms of types of expressed attitudes. This will enable us to integrate our taxonomy with the SAS.

To *express* an attitude in uttering something is, in our conception, to R-intend that the hearer take one's utterance as reason to believe one has the attitude. The speaker need not have the attitude expressed, and the hearer need not form a corresponding attitude. The speaker's having the attitude expressed is the mark of sincerity, but illocutionary or communicative success does not require sincerity. If the hearer forms a corresponding attitude that the speaker intended him to form, the speaker has achieved a perlocutionary effect in addition to illocutionary uptake.

Individuating communicative illocutionary acts in terms of expressed attitudes leaves ample room for a rich diversity of act types. In most cases the speaker expresses not only his own (putative) attitude toward the propositional content but also his intention that the hearer form a corresponding attitude. For example, to inform someone of something is not only to express a belief in it but also to express one's intention that the hearer believe it. Act types are further differentiated by the reasons for or the strengths of the attitudes expressed. For example, what we call "confirmatives" are distinguished from assertions generally by $S$'s expressing his belief as being the result of some truth-seeking procedure. And within the class of what we call "advisories," the difference between urging someone to do something and merely

suggesting he do it is marked by the difference in strength in $S$'s expressed intention or desire that $H$ do it. Finally, some act types are picked out by expressed attitudes concerning the context or occasion of utterance: an answer is R-intended to be taken as a response to a question; an apology is R-intended to be taken as occasioned by the speaker's having done some regrettable thing to the hearer. As we develop the taxonomy in detail, just how these various dimensions of expressed attitudes determine illocutionary act types will be made clear and concrete.

Many taxonomies of illocutionary acts have been proposed, but we will not discuss or compare all of them. Austin's original scheme (1962, Lecture XII) included a rich variety of illocutionary act types, but, as Searle (1975b) has argued, there are no clear principles by which Austin collected them into his five classes. All subsequent taxonomies[1] are attempted improvements on Austin's, but only Searle's is tied to a general theory of illocutionary acts. We agree with Searle that a scheme of classification should be principled. Its categories should not overlap[2]—at least not beyond what can be expected from the nature of the subject—and the entries in each category should satisfy the criteria for belonging to that category. Moreover, to be of theoretical interest the scheme's bases of classification must be tied to some systematic account of illocutionary acts.

The fundamental idea behind our taxonomy is that the illocutionary intents, or expressed attitudes, by which types of illocutionary acts are distinguished are all homogeneous with the speech act schema. That is, the SAS represents the general form of illocutionary intention and inference, and the entries in the taxonomy provide the content, as is evident in the concluding step of the SAS: the identification of the illocutionary act being performed. Since such acts are identified by their intents ($H$'s recognition of $S$'s expressed attitudes), the distinguishing features of each illocutionary act type specify the very thing $H$ must identify in the last step of the SAS.

A more obvious merit (we hope) of our taxonomy is its comprehensiveness and explicitness. It covers a great many types of illocutionary acts in detail, not only labeling them but specifying what distinguishes them. We divide illocutionary acts into six general categories. Two of these categories, *effectives* and *verdictives*, are conventional not communicative; they will be discussed in chapter 6. The four main kinds of communicative illocutionary acts are *constatives, directives, commissives*, and *acknowledgments*; these correspond roughly to Austin's ex-

Communicative Illocutionary Acts

| I | II | III | IV |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constatives | Directives | Commissives | Acknowledgments |
| Assertives | Requestives | Promises | Apologize |
| Predictives | Questions | Offers | Condole |
| Retrodictives | Requirements | | Congratulate |
| Descriptives | Prohibitives | | Greet |
| Ascriptives | Permissives | | Thank |
| Informatives | Advisories | | Bid |
| Confirmatives | | | Accept |
| Concessives | | | Reject |
| Retractives | | | |
| Assentives | | | |
| Dissentives | | | |
| Disputatives | | | |
| Responsives | | | |
| Suggestives | | | |
| Suppositives | | | |

Figure 3.1 Classification of communicative illocutionary acts (in category IV specific verbs are listed)

positives, exercitives, commissives, and behabitives, respectively, and closely to Searle's representatives, directives, commissives, and expressives, although our characterizations of them are different from Searle's.

For us, *constatives* express the speaker's belief and his intention or desire that the hearer have or form a like belief. *Directives* express the speaker's attitude toward some prospective action by the hearer and his intention that his utterance, or the attitude it expresses, be taken as a reason for the hearer's action. *Commissives* express the speaker's intention and belief that his utterance obligates him to do something (perhaps under certain conditions). And *acknowledgments* express feelings regarding the hearer or, in cases where the utterance is clearly perfunctory or formal, the speaker's intention that his utterance satisfy a social expectation to express certain feelings and his belief that it does. Figure 3.1 lists the subcategories falling under these four headings. They will be discussed in detail in the sections to follow, where specific R-intentions will be spelled out, together with, when not obvious, the correlative perlocutionary intentions.

# 3.1. CONSTATIVES

In general, a constative is the expression of a belief, together with the expression of an intention that the hearer form (or continue to hold) a like belief. The following analyses of various specific kinds of constatives exhibit this pattern.

*Assertives* (simple): (affirm, allege, assert, aver, avow, claim, declare, deny (assert ... not), indicate, maintain, propound, say, state, submit)
In uttering $e$, $S$ asserts that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that $P$, and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that $P$.

*Predictives:* (forecast, predict, prophesy)
In uttering $e$, $S$ predicts that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that it will be the case that $P$, and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that it will be the case that $P$.

*Retrodictives:* (recount, report)
In uttering $e$, $S$ retrodicts that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that it was the case that $P$, and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that it was the case that $P$.

*Descriptives:* (appraise, assess, call, categorize, characterize, classify, date, describe, diagnose, evaluate, grade, identify, portray, rank)
In uttering $e$, $S$ describes $o$ as $F$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that $o$ is $F$, and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that $o$ is $F$.

*Ascriptives:* (ascribe, attribute, predicate)
In uttering $e$, $S$ ascribes $F$ to $o$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that $F$ applies to $o$, and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that $F$ applies to $o$.

*Informatives:* (advise, announce, apprise, disclose, inform, insist, notify, point out, report, reveal, tell, testify)
In uttering $e$, $S$ informs $H$ that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that $P$, and
ii. the intention that $H$ form the belief that $P$.

*Confirmatives:* (appraise, assess, bear witness, certify, conclude, confirm, corroborate, diagnose, find, judge, substantiate, testify, validate, verify, vouch for)

In uttering $e$, $S$ confirms (the claim) that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that $P$, based on some truth-seeking procedure, and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that $P$ because $S$ has support for $P$.

*Concessives:* (acknowledge, admit, agree, allow, assent, concede, concur, confess, grant, own)
In uttering $e$, $S$ concedes that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that $P$, contrary to what he would like to believe or contrary to what he previously believed or avowed, and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that $P$.

*Retractives:* (abjure, correct, deny, disavow, disclaim, disown, recant, renounce, repudiate, retract, take back, withdraw)
In uttering $e$, $S$ retracts the claim that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. that he no longer believes that $P$, contrary to what he previously indicated he believed, and
ii. the intention that $H$ not believe that $P$.

*Assentives:* (accept, agree, assent, concur)
In uttering $e$, $S$ assents to the claim that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that $P$, as claimed by $H$ (or as otherwise under discussion), and
ii. the intention (perhaps already fulfilled) that $H$ believe that $P$.

*Dissentives:* (differ, disagree, dissent, reject)
In uttering $e$, $S$ dissents from the claim that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the disbelief that $P$, contrary to what was claimed by $H$ (or was otherwise under discussion), and
ii. the intention that $H$ disbelieve that $P$.

*Disputatives:* (demur, dispute, object, protest, question)
In uttering $e$, $S$ disputes the claim that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that there is reason not to believe that $P$, contrary to what was claimed by $H$ (or was otherwise under discussion), and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that there is reason not to believe that $P$.

*Responsives:* (answer, reply, respond, retort)
In uttering $e$, $S$ responds that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that $P$, which $H$ has inquired about, and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that $P$.

*Suggestives:* (conjecture, guess, hypothesize, speculate, suggest)
In uttering $e$, $S$ suggests that $P$ if $S$ expresses:

i. the belief that there is reason, but not sufficient reason, to believe that $P$, and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that there is reason, but not sufficient reason, to believe that $P$.

*Suppositives:* (assume, hypothesize, postulate, stipulate, suppose, theorize)
In uttering $e$, $S$ supposes that $P$ if $S$ expresses:
i. the belief that it is worth considering the consequences of $P$, and
ii. the intention that $H$ believe that it is worth considering the consequences of $P$.

We said at the outset that in general, constatives are the expression of a belief, together with the expression of an intention that the hearer form, or continue to hold, a similar belief. Simple *assertives*, *descriptives*, and *ascriptives* are of this sort. The perlocutionary intention normally accompanying these acts is that the hearer believe, or continue to believe, the proposition ($P$) in question, perhaps by way of believing that the speaker believes it. That is, over and above identifying the belief and the intention expressed, $H$ is intended to believe that $S$ believes the proposition and, possibly because of this, to believe the proposition himself. Of course, there are cases in which the speaker knows perfectly well that the hearer disbelieves that $P$ and will not change his mind just because $S$ believes that $P$. Nevertheless, $S$ wants $H$ to ascribe the belief that $P$ to $S$, and, even if he does not intend $H$ to believe that $P$, at least he wishes that $H$ believe it; in these cases $S$ expresses the wish, rather than the intention, that $H$ believe that $P$. As we suggested in chapter 1, when in performing an illocutionary act $S$ expresses a certain intention regarding $H$, in general he has the corresponding perlocutionary intention. However, if $S$ disbelieves that his utterance will have any such perlocutionary effect on $H$, he expresses at most the wish that such an effect result. So $S$ may have the perlocutionary intention that $H$ attribute to him this wish. Finally, there are cases where $S$ thinks $H$ won't take his utterance as sincere. That is, $S$ expects $H$ not to attribute to him the belief and the intention $S$ is expressing. In this case $S$ cannot expect to have fulfilled, and therefore cannot reasonably form, the perlocutionary intention that $H$ believe that he ($S$) believes that $P$, much less the further intention that $H$ believe it himself.

The *assertives* listed vary in strength of belief expressed and in the corresponding expressed intention. When one maintains or avows

something, one's expressed belief and intention are very strong, whereas the belief and intention expressed when one alleges or submits that something is the case are much weaker. We have reserved the separate categories of *suggestives* and *suppositives* for constative utterances that express not even a weak belief that $P$, but only the belief that there is reason to believe that $P$ or that (because it is possible or plausible that $P$ is true) it is worth considering the consequences of $P$.

Some of the verbs listed as *descriptives* are rather specialized in their coverage. Verbs like "appraise," "date," "diagnose," and "grade" apply to restricted categories of things. These verbs are not synonymous, but that does not mean they designate different sorts of illocutionary acts. They don't: not every difference between illocutionary verbs is illocutionary.

What distinguishes *informatives* from simple assertives is that the speaker expresses (in addition to his belief) the intention that the hearer *form* the belief that $P$. For assertives, $S$'s expressed intention is that $H$ form the belief, or continue to believe, that $P$. We might say that at the time of utterance, $S$ presumes that $H$ does not believe that $P$. Here we rely on a notion of *illocutionary presumption*: in his illocutionary intention, $S$ presumes that $q$ if the truth of $q$ is necessary for the rationality of his illocutionary intention. Of course, the notion of rationality is multifarious; all we mean, in speaking of the rationality of illocutionary intentions, is that there is good reason to believe that the intention will be fulfilled (by being recognized). Generally, for an illocutionary act with a presumption, the truth of that presumption is necessary for the success of that act. With this rough notion of illocutionary presumption, we will be able to distinguish some of the other kinds of constatives partly in terms of what is presumed.

*Concessives, retractives, assentives, dissentives,* and *disputatives* all involve a presumption about the contextual relevance of the expressed belief. A concessive expresses a belief contrary to what $S$ would like to believe or contrary to what he previously believed or avowed, whereas a retractive expresses that $S$ no longer believes what he previously indicated he believed, but in both cases it is presumed that the question of $S$'s belief has come up in the conversation or is otherwise directly relevant to the current stage of conversation. Assentives, dissentives, and disputatives all presume that a certain claim has been made by $H$ or that someone's claim, not necessarily $S$'s or $H$'s, is under discussion. To assent that $P$ is to express agreement with this claim, to dissent from it is to express disagreement, and to dispute it is to express the belief that there is reason not to believe that $P$.

*Confirmatives* express not only the speaker's belief that *P* but that he believes it as a result of some truth-seeking procedure, such as observation, investigation, or argument. Since the latter belief is also expressed, it is not a mere illocutionary presumption. *Responsives* are R-intended as replies to an inquiry by *H*. In responding that *P*, *S* expresses his belief that *P* and that he is so doing in answer to *H*. Obviously, in some contexts a responsive can be a dissentive or a disputative as well. *Suggestives* and *suppositives* that *P* are not expressions of belief that *P*. In suggesting (conjecturing, hypothesizing) that *P*, *S* expresses merely the belief that there is reason to believe that *P*, but not sufficient reason to believe it. And in supposing (assuming, postulating) that *P*, what *S* expresses is the belief that it is worth considering the consequences of *P*, irrespective of whether it is true that *P*. Here *S* is likely to have the perlocutionary intention that *H* is to expect *S* to take up a discussion of *P* or its consequences.

An analysis of constative verbs with specialized ranges of application, like "appraise," "testify," "recant," and "postulate," would specify what that range of application is and that the speaker presumes his utterance to fall within this range. Such an analysis would take into account the strength of the expressed attitude. Just as, among assertives, maintaining something expresses a stronger belief than alleging it, so among disputatives, to object to something expresses a stronger belief (regarding reasons for disbelieving the proposition in question) than does questioning something. There is a similar difference between the suggestives hypothesizing and conjecturing. The analyses for the central cases of each type would have to be modified slightly to reflect these differences.

For certain purposes, the subtypes we have given could be supplemented or subdivided further. No doubt additions could be made to our list of verbs for each type, though we suspect that most such verbs would be too specialized in scope to be of interest here. Finally, we should point out that some verbs occur under more than one heading. This does not necessarily mean that the types overlap, only that some verbs name more than one type. Nevertheless, there is such overlap. Most of the specialized types of constatives satisfy the definition of assertives, and responsives, for example, overlap with disputatives and with suggestives. This means not that our definitions or conceptions of these types of constatives are hazy, but that some illocutionary act tokens can be of more than one type, performed with the R-intention appropriate to each.

## 3.2. DIRECTIVES

Directives express the speaker's attitude toward some prospective action by the hearer. If this were all they expressed, they would be merely constatives with a restriction on propositional content (namely, that a prospective action be ascribed to the hearer). However, they also express the speaker's intention (desire, wish) that his utterance or the attitude it expresses be taken as (a) reason for the hearer to act. Rather than use Austin's term "exercitive," which seems somewhat restricted in scope, we have borrowed Searle's term "directive." It is both to the point and conveniently vague, being broad enough to cover the six kinds of acts that belong in this category.

*Requestives:* (ask, beg, beseech, implore, insist, invite, petition, plead, pray, request, solicit, summon, supplicate, tell, urge)
In uttering *e*, *S* requests *H* to *A* if *S* expresses:
i. the desire that *H* do *A*, and
ii. the intention that *H* do *A* because (at least partly) of *S*'s desire.

*Questions:* (ask, inquire, interrogate, query, question, quiz)
In uttering *e*, *S* questions *H* as to whether or not *P* if *S* expresses:
i. the desire that *H* tell *S* whether or not *P*, and
ii. the intention that *H* tell *S* whether or not *P* because of *S*'s desire.

*Requirements:* (bid, charge, command, demand, dictate, direct, enjoin, instruct, order, prescribe, require)
In uttering *e*, *S* requires *H* to *A* if *S* expresses:
i. the belief that his utterance, in virtue of his authority over *H*, constitutes sufficient reason for *H* to *A*, and
ii. the intention that *H* do *A* because of *S*'s utterance.

*Prohibitives:* (enjoin, forbid, prohibit, proscribe, restrict)
In uttering *e*, *S* prohibits *H* from *A*-ing if *S* expresses:
i. the belief that his utterance, in virtue of his authority over *H*, constitutes sufficient reason for *H* not to *A*, and
ii. the intention that because of *S*'s utterance *H* not do *A*.

*Permissives:* (agree to, allow, authorize, bless, consent to, dismiss, excuse, exempt, forgive, grant, license, pardon, release, sanction)
In uttering *e*, *S* permits *H* to *A* if *S* expresses:
i. the belief that his utterance, in virtue of his authority over *H*, entitles *H* to *A*, and
ii. the intention that *H* believe that *S*'s utterance entitles him to *A*.

*Advisories:* (admonish, advise, caution, counsel, propose, recommend, suggest, urge, warn)

In uttering *e*, *S* advises *H* to *A* if *S* expresses:

i. the belief that there is (sufficient) reason for *H* to *A*, and

ii. the intention that *H* take *S*'s belief as (sufficient) reason for him to *A*.

*Requestives* express the speaker's desire that the hearer do something. Moreover, they express the speaker's intention (or, if it is clear that he doesn't expect compliance, his desire or wish) that the hearer take this expressed desire as reason (or part of his reason) to act. The corresponding perlocutionary intentions, as might be foreseen, are that *H* take *S* actually to have the desire and the intention he is expressing and that *H* perform the action requested of him. Verbs of requesting connote variation in strength of attitude expressed, as between "invite" and "insist" and between "ask" and "beg." The stronger ones convey a sense of earnestness or urgency. "Beseech" and "supplicate," among others, convey both an appeal to the hearer's sympathy and a special manner of performance. Some verbs of requesting are rather specialized in scope. "Summon" (or "invite" taken narrowly) refer to requests for the hearer's presence; "beg" and "solicit" apply to requests for contributions or favors.

*Questions* are special cases of requests, special in that what is requested is that the hearer provide the speaker with certain information. There are differences between questions, but not all of them are important for an illocutionary taxonomy. There are exam questions and rhetorical questions. "Interrogate" suggests duress in a way that "ask" does not. Finally, "quiz" and "query" do not quite fit our analysis, in that they cannot be used to report the content of a question but only its topic (*S* quizzed *H* about topology).

*Requirements,* such as ordering or dictating, should not be confused with requests, even strong ones. There is an important difference. In requesting, the speaker expresses his intention that the hearer take his (*S*'s) expressed desire as a reason to act; in requirements *S*'s expressed intention is that *H* take *S*'s utterance as a reason to act, indeed as sufficient reason to act. As a matter of fact, requirements do not necessarily involve the speaker's expressing any desire at all that the hearer act in a certain way. It might be quite clear that *S* couldn't care less. Instead, what *S* expresses is his belief that his utterance constitutes sufficient reason for *H* to perform the action. In expressing this belief and the corresponding intention, *S* is presuming that he has the author-

ity over *H* (physical, psychological, or institutional) that gives such weight to his very utterances.

*Prohibitives,* such as forbidding or proscribing, are essentially requirements that the hearer not do a certain thing. To prohibit someone from smoking is to require him not to smoke. We list prohibitives separately because they take a distinct grammatical form and because there are a number of such verbs. We will let the entry for prohibitives speak for itself.

*Permissives,* like requirements and prohibitives, presume the speaker's authority. They express *S*'s belief, and his intention that *H* believe, that *S*'s utterance constitutes sufficient reason for *H* to feel free to do a certain action. The obvious reasons for issuing a permissive are either to grant a request for permission or to remove some antecedent restriction against the action in question. It would seem, therefore, that the speaker presumes either that such a request has been made or that such a restriction exists. It is not necessary but it is common, at least with noninstitutional permissives, that the speaker express that he does not wish, desire, or expect the hearer not to perform the action in question. But, as with requirements, it is not the speaker's expressed attitude but his utterance that is intended to figure in the hearer's reason. Some of the verbs of permitting are highly specialized, such as "bless," "dismiss" ('permit to leave'), "excuse" ('permit not to make restitution'), and "release" ('permit not to fulfill an obligation').

As for *advisories,* what the speaker expresses is not the desire that *H* do a certain action but the belief that doing it is a good idea, that it is in *H*'s interest. *S* expresses also the intention that *H* take this belief of *S*'s as a reason to act.[3] The corresponding perlocutionary intentions are that *H* take *S* to believe that *S* actually has the attitudes he is expressing and that *H* perform the action he is being advised to perform. (It is possible, of course, that *S* really does not care.) Advisories vary in strength of expressed belief. Compare suggesting with admonishing. Furthermore, some advisories imply a special reason that the recommended action is a good idea. In warning, for example, *S* presumes the presence of some likely source of danger or trouble for *H*.

## 3.3. COMMISSIVES

This is the one category of illocutionary acts for which Austin's original label has been retained universally. Commissives are acts of obligating oneself or of proposing to obligate oneself to do something specified in

the propositional content, which may also specify conditions under which the deed is to be done or does not have to be done. In committing oneself to do A, one expresses the intention to do A and the belief that one's utterance commits one to doing it, at least under the conditions specified or mutually believed to be relevant. These conditions may include H's accepting one's proposal or commitment to do A or at least his not rejecting it (ordinarily, the absence of explicit rejection may be taken as—is mutually believed to count as—acceptance). In addition to expressing such intention and belief, the speaker expresses the intention that H take him to have this intention and belief. The corresponding perlocutionary intention is that H believe S has this intention and belief and that H himself believe that S is obligated to do A, at least if the required conditions are met.

We distinguish two main types of commissives, *promises* and *offers*. Promises are acts of obligating oneself; offers are proposals to obligate oneself. Under promising, we provide a sampling of special cases, including contracting and betting, three commissive/constative hybrids (swearing, guaranteeing, and surrendering), and one commissive/directive hybrid, inviting. The definitions are self-explanatory. As for offers, besides the general case we give but two special cases, volunteering and bidding.[4]

*Promises:* (promise, swear, vow)
In uttering e, S promises H to A if S expresses:
i. the belief that his utterance obligates him to A,
ii. the intention to A, and
iii. the intention that H believe that S's utterance obligates S to A and that S intends to A.

*contract:* S and H make mutually conditional promises; fulfillment of each is conditional on the fulfillment of the other.

*bet:* S promises to do something (for instance, pay a certain amount) if a certain event occurs, on condition that H promises to do a certain thing if a certain other event occurs.

*swear that:* S asserts (constative) that P and promises that he is telling the truth.

*guarantee that:* S affirms (constative) the quality of something, x, and promises to make repairs or restitution if x is relevantly defective.

*guarantee x:* S promises to make repairs or restitution if x is defective in some relevant respect.

*surrender:* S admits (constative) defeat and promises not to continue fighting.

*invite:* S requests (directive) H's presence and promises acceptance of his presence.

*Offers:* (offer, propose)
In uttering e, S offers A to H if S expresses:
i. the belief that S's utterance obligates him to A on condition that H indicates he wants S to A,
ii. the intention to A on condition that H indicates he wants S to A, and
iii. the intention that H believe that S's utterance obligates S to A and that S intends to A, on condition that H indicates he wants S to A.

*volunteer:* S offers his services.

*bid:* S offers to give something (in a certain amount) in exchange for something.

## 3.4. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Acknowledgments, as we call them, are the central cases of Austin's motley class of "behabitives." They express, perfunctorily if not genuinely, certain feelings toward the hearer. These feelings and their expression are appropriate to particular sorts of occasions. For example, greeting expresses pleasure at meeting or seeing someone, thanking expresses gratitude for having received something, apologizing expresses regret for having harmed or bothered the hearer, condoling expresses sympathy for H's having suffered some misfortune (not S's doing), and congratulating expresses gladness for H's having done or received something noteworthy. Commonly, but not necessarily, such an occasion, when it arises, is mutually recognized by S and H, and then it is not only appropriate but expected by H that S will issue the relevant acknowledgment.

Because acknowledgments are expected on particular occasions, they are often issued not so much to express a genuine feeling as to satisfy the social expectation that such a feeling be expressed. In our list of acknowledgments the disjunctive definitions reflect this fact.

*Apologize:*
In uttering e, S apologizes to H for D if S expresses:
i. regret for having done D to H, and
ii. the intention that H believe that S regrets having done D to H, or

i. the intention that his utterance satisfy the social expectation that one express regret for having done something regrettable like D, and
ii. the intention that H take S's utterance as satisfying this expectation.

*Condole:* (commiserate, condole)
In uttering e, S condoles H for (misfortune) D if S expresses:
i. sympathy with H's having (or suffering) D, and
ii. the intention that H believe that S sympathizes with H's having D, or
i. the intention that his utterance satisfy the social expectation that one express sympathy for misfortunes like D, and
ii. the intention that H take S's utterance as satisfying this expectation.

*Congratulate:* (compliment, congratulate, felicitate)
In uttering e, S congratulates H for D if S expresses:
i. gladness for H's having D(-ed), and
ii. the intention that H believe that S is glad that H has D(-ed), or
i. the intention that his utterance satisfy the social expectation that one express gladness for good fortunes like D(-ing), and
ii. the intention that H take S's utterance as satisfying this expectation.

*Greet:*
In uttering e, S greets H if S expresses:
i. pleasure at seeing (or meeting) H, and
ii. the intention that H believe that S is pleased to see (or meet) H, or
i. the intention that his utterance satisfy the social expectation that one express pleasure at seeing (or meeting) someone, and
ii. the intention that H take S's utterance as satisfying this expectation.

*Thank:*
In uttering e, S thanks H for D if S expresses:
i. gratitude to H for D, and
ii. the intention that H believe that S is grateful to H for D, or
i. the intention that his utterance satisfy the social expectation that one express gratitude at being benefited, and
ii. the intention that H take S's utterance as satisfying this expectation.
"No thanks": S thanks H for offering D and rejects the offer.

*Bid:* (bid, wish)
In uttering e, S bids H good (happy) D if S expresses:
i. the hope that H's D will be good (happy), and

ii. the intention that H believe that S hopes that H's D will be good (happy), or
i. the intention that his utterance satisfy the social expectation that one express good hopes when the question of another's prospects arises, and
ii. the intention that H take S's utterance as satisfying this expectation.

*Accept*—acknowledge an acknowledgment:
In uttering e, S accepts H's acknowledgment if S expresses:
i. appreciation for H's acknowledgment, and
ii. the intention that H believe that S appreciates H's acknowledgment, or
i. the intention that his utterance satisfy the social expectation that one express appreciation of an acknowledgment, and
ii. the intention that H take S's utterance as satisfying this expectation.
"You're welcome": S accepts H's thanks.

*Reject:* (refuse, reject, spurn)
In uttering e, S rejects H's acknowledgment if S expresses:
i. lack of appreciation of H's acknowledgment,
ii. the intention that H believe that S fails to appreciate H's acknowledgment, and (perhaps also)
iii. the intention that his utterance violate the social expectation that one express appreciation of an acknowledgment, and
iv. the intention that H take S's utterance as violating this expectation.

When one apologizes to someone, either one expresses regret (for what one has done) or one expresses the intention that one's utterance satisfy the social expectation to express regret (without actually expressing regret). Perfunctory acknowledgments thus require the implicit cooperation of the hearer—they are issued, quite obviously to all concerned, routinely or as a formality, as when one apologizes for accidentally bumping someone.

Despite the fact that perfunctory acknowledgments do not express genuine feelings, in our society they are generally regarded as acts of courtesy. Indeed, when the acknowledgment is occasioned by something trivial or when the occasion warrants nothing more than a perfunctory acknowledgment, for the hearer to question the speaker's sincerity would be an act of gross discourtesy and social disruptiveness. On the other hand, there are occasions, owing to the seriousness

of the matter or to the relation between the speaker and the hearer, when it is expected that genuine feelings be expressed. We won't pursue the sociology of acknowledgments.

In issuing an acknowledgment, the speaker presumes the existence of the occasion to which the acknowledgment is appropriate. For example, in thanking $H$ for something, $S$ presumes that he has received something from $H$, and in apologizing to $H$, $S$ presumes that he has done something regrettable to $H$. His illocutionary act of acknowledging could not succeed—the hearer could not recognize his R-intention—unless this presumption were correct, or at least mutually believed. The existence of the relevant occasion is presumed, not asserted, by the speaker, and it is often unnecessary for him to mention the occasion explicitly: if someone gives you a cigarette, it is enough to say "Thank you." But if someone sends you a box of cigars, it is necessary to say, when you next see the donor, "Thanks for the fine cigars," or something to that effect. Condolences and congratulations generally require such a specification, because they are usually occasioned by some event removed from the current encounter of $S$ and $H$.

In acknowledgments, the only hearer-directed intention expressed over and above the expressed feeling is that $H$ believe that $S$ has the expressed feeling. Hence the only perlocutionary intention associated with acknowledgments is that the hearer take the speaker to have the expressed feeling or, in perfunctory cases, to regard the utterance as satisfying the relevant social expectation. However, an acknowledgment may invite an acknowledgment in response, which might be construed as a perlocutionary effect if intended (it need not be, of course). Greetings and farewells are exchanged, thanks are accepted ("You're welcome"), congratulations and condolences are accepted with a "Thank you" or the like, and apologies may be accepted ("That's OK") or rejected ("Saying you're sorry isn't enough").

Similar to congratulations and condolences are biddings or (expressing) wishes, which may be negative, as in the case of curses. Strictly speaking, these may be only constatives (namely, to the effect that one has a certain wish), but in some cases biddings are called for and must then be classed as acknowledgments.

Pardoning, excusing, and forgiving may seem to be acknowledgments (asking to be pardoned, excused, or forgiven is clearly a request). However, though they may be related to acknowledgments, as when one forgives someone for something for which he apologized (or even excuses him from having to apologize), they seem to us to be

permissives. They are acts of releasing a person from any obligation (or of refusing to acknowledge his putative obligation) incurred from doing something to the speaker. Thus, they permit him not to compensate the speaker for what he has done, or, where that is not at issue, they permit him not to feel responsible for what he has done.

## 3.5. FELICITY CONDITIONS

One taxonomic issue concerns the notion of felicity conditions introduced by Austin in his William James Lectures (1962). Many philosophers and linguists have adopted Austin's term, but their use of it has sometimes been rather less discriminating than his. The main problem has been failure to observe the distinction between conditions necessary (and sufficient) for the successful performance of an act, and the conditions necessary (and sufficient) for a completely nondefective or felicitous performance of the act. In most discussions of felicity conditions, those conditions necessary for the existence of an instance of the act are some unspecified subset of the conditions necessary for the nondefective performance of the act. For instance, Searle (1969) gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the (literal and direct) nondefective performance of various speech acts, yet the absence of only some of these conditions precludes the performance of the act. For the sake of clarity we will call conditions that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient for the performance of an act its *success conditions;* we will call those conditions that are not success conditions but are required for nondefectiveness *felicity conditions.* Is there any role for felicity conditions to play in a theory of speech acts? If there is, how would that role be filled in our theory?

When one looks at the literature on speech acts, there seem to be four different motivations for having felicity conditions in a speech act theory. First, Austin looked to the ways various acts can go wrong as a guide to what it takes for the act to go right (1962, Lecture II). Although he constructed a fairly elaborate taxonomy of "infelicities," his repeated reference to "conventional procedures" makes it pretty clear that his doctrine of infelicities is appropriate mainly for the "highly developed explicit performatives" associated with conventional, ritual, and ceremonial acts, which we discuss in chapter 6. Austin's doctrine has no obvious extension to communicative illocutionary acts.

A second motive for having felicity conditions comes from Searle (1965, 1969), who apparently includes felicity conditions among his necessary conditions because he is inclined to think that "we shall not

be able to get a set of knock-down necessary and sufficient conditions that will exactly mirror the ordinary use of the word 'promise'. I am confining my discussion, therefore, to the center of the concept of promising and ignoring the fringe, borderline, and partially defective cases" (1965, 47). Still, it is not clear why adopting this strategy of first analyzing paradigm cases (then seeing the rest as deviations from the paradigm) should have the consequence that felicity conditions cannot be distinguished from success conditions. One could just pick central cases to give success conditions for. Of course this would involve some modifications of Searle's format for analyzing speech acts. Essential conditions and propositional content conditions always seem to be success conditions, and sincerity conditions always seem to be felicity conditions. Preparatory conditions (or parts thereof) go different ways for different acts. Thus, a preparatory condition for asserting (that it is not obvious to both $S$ and $H$ that $H$ knows that $p$) is clearly a felicity condition, whereas part of the preparatory conditions on promising (that $S$ believes $H$ would prefer $S$'s doing $A$ to $S$'s not doing $A$) is arguably necessary as a success condition to differentiate promising from threatening.

A third motive for felicity conditions has come to the fore recently in the discussion of indirect speech acts. There seem to be some generalizations over indirect speech acts that are best stated in terms of both success and felicity conditions of speech acts. We will return to this matter in chapters 4, 9, and 10.

Finally, some authors have claimed (or suggested) that felicity conditions might be related to various grammatical phenomena. For instance, Heringer proposes that a variety of grammatical facts concerning "qualifying *if*-clauses," as he calls them, "can be explicated only by reference to the illocutionary acts performed by the utterances which contain them . . . the syntactic form of the *if*-clause is directly related to the intrinsic condition which it calls into question" (1972, 1). As it turns out, though, only some of the conditions are used in this way; in particular, they must be "conditions on the beliefs of the speaker performing the illocutionary act" (1972, 43). Any theory taking these beliefs into account can handle these facts if Heringer's can, and the discussion of qualifying *if*-clauses does not motivate a general theory of felicity conditions, at least not of the sort envisaged by Austin. The ways an act may be defective, in an unqualified use of "defective," may be limited only by one's imagination. Thus it is reasonable that only certain kinds of defect be singled out. But then some reason must

be provided for why those particular kinds are theoretically significant. So far we have found no compelling reason for a general theory of felicity conditions and (assuming indirect speech acts will not provide such a reason) propose no such theory here.

### 3.6. INFELICITY AND OBVIOUS INSINCERITY

Our taxonomy distinguishes types of communicative illocutionary acts by the attitudes the speaker expresses in performing them: the speaker expresses a certain attitude toward the propositional content as well as the intention that the hearer have or form a corresponding propositional attitude. We have defined expressing an attitude as R-intending the hearer to take one's utterance as reason to believe that one has the attitude. The speaker's having the attitudes expressed is the mark of sincerity, but sincerity is not required for communicative success; nor is the hearer's believing the speaker has the attitudes expressed. Thus, a communicative illocutionary act can succeed even if the speaker is insincere and even if the hearer believes he is insincere. After all, in expressing certain attitudes the speaker is merely R-intending the hearer to take his utterance as *reason* to believe him to have those attitudes. So the speaker need not intend this reason to be sufficient, and the hearer need not take it to be sufficient. Generally, though, it is intended to be sufficient and is taken to be; generally it is sufficient. Even if the speaker does not have the attitudes he is expressing, there is no reason, most of the time, to think he does not have them. And even if there is reason to think he does not have them, there is likely to be no reason to think he does not R-intend one to think there is reason to believe he has them. We may not trust him, but he may not realize that.

But suppose that the speaker's insincerity is obviously obvious; that is, $S$ and $H$ mutually believe that $S$ does not have one or another of the attitudes he is expressing. In the case of a statement, for example, it might be mutually believed that $S$ does not believe what he is stating or that $H$ inalterably disbelieves what $S$ is stating. In the case of a request, it might be mutually believed that $S$ really does not want $H$ to perform the requested action or that $H$ won't perform it no matter what $S$ wants. Such cases as these raise certain questions for our taxonomy: (1) Does the speaker really express the attitudes it is mutually believed he does not have? (2) Is he really performing an illocutionary act of the sort (stating, requesting) that he would be performing if he weren't obviously insincere?

To take an example, suppose that $S$ says to $H$ that he ($S$) has not been drinking. However, $S$ and $H$ mutually believe that $S$ has alcohol on his breath and that an empty Ripple bottle is lying at $S$'s feet. Suppose that under these circumstances $H$ cannot attribute to $S$ the belief that he ($S$) has not been drinking or the intention that $H$ believe that $S$ has not been drinking.[5] It is obvious to $H$ not only that $S$ is lying but that $S$ believes $H$ believes $S$ is lying. Assuming that $H$ is right, does it follow (1) that $S$ cannot be expressing the belief, and the intention that $H$ believe, that $S$ has not been drinking, and (2) that $S$ cannot be stating that he has not been drinking? Notwithstanding the facts of the case, $S$'s utterance is R-intended by $S$ to be taken by $H$ as reason to think that $S$ believes, and intends $H$ to believe, that he has not been drinking. Under the circumstances $S$ cannot rationally R-intend his utterance to be *sufficient* reason for $H$ to make these attributions, but that is not what our conception of expressing an attitude requires. By itself, $S$'s utterance is, and can be R-intended to be taken to be, *a* reason, despite the fact that it can be overridden by mutual contextual beliefs to the contrary. Even when defeated, a reason is a reason. Accordingly, $S$ can express a belief and an intention despite mutual beliefs to the contrary. By definition, then, he can state that he has not been drinking.

The case of obviously obvious insincerity does not present problems for our conception of expressing an attitude or for our taxonomy of illocutionary acts in terms of types of attitudes expressed. Indeed, the example couldn't have been described in the way it was unless it was a case of expressing a certain belief and a certain intention and of performing the illocutionary act of stating. Otherwise, how could it be described as a case of obviously obvious insincerity? After all, there had to be something for the speaker to be insincere about, namely, the attitudes he expressed. Equally, there had to be some illocutionary act that he was performing insincerely.[6]

In considering the case of obvious insincerity and its implications for our taxonomy of communicative illocutionary acts, one should keep in mind that all these acts are performed pursuant to the communicative presumption (CP) and that their identity is worked out by the hearer in accordance with the SAS. That is, the hearer must explain the speaker's utterance by identifying the intention with which it was issued, and this consists in identifying the expressed attitudes. Expressing an attitude is R-intending the hearer to take one's utterance as reason, not necessarily sufficient reason, to think that one has the

attitude in question; therefore, in identifying the speaker's illocutionary intention, the hearer must consider whether the speaker is likely to have such an attitude. Before thinking $S$ to be expressing attitudes that there is mutually believed reason to believe he does not have, $H$ might rule out the possibility that the CP is inoperative, for example, that $S$ is kidding.[7] In general, any reason to think that $S$ does not have an attitude he appears to be expressing, especially if the reason is mutually believed, is a reason to think $S$ is being nonliteral or that the CP is not in effect. However, there are other possibilities. For instance, to avoid admitting something or committing himself, $S$ has good reason to express attitudes he does not have, despite its being obvious that he doesn't have them. His insincerity is transparent, and yet by his utterance he has provided $H$ with a basis for determining precisely what $S$ is being insincere about. The obviousness of $S$'s insincerity does not prevent him from performing the illocutionary act of expressing attitudes he doesn't have. Rather, it prevents his utterance from providing (and being R-intended to provide) sufficient reason for $H$ to think he has those attitudes. However, this does not mean his utterance provides no reason, for unless it provided some reason by being R-intended to, it would not be a case of obvious insincerity.

Obvious insincerity is not the only way in which $S$'s utterance can fail to be R-intended to provide sufficient reason for the hearer to ascribe certain attitudes to the speaker. Another route is obvious superfluity, where it is already mutually believed what $S$'s attitudes are, or where it is already mutually believed that, for example, $H$ believes what $S$ believes or will do what $S$ wants him to do. Here the reasons that $S$'s utterance would normally provide for attributing beliefs or intentions to $S$ do not need to be provided. But that does not mean that they are not provided anyway. Of course, the hearer, in identifying the expressed attitudes, would need to figure out why the speaker is bothering to express them.

We have not attempted to enumerate the sorts of reasons a speaker might have for expressing attitudes he obviously does not have. We have pointed out only that he can successfully, however infelicitously, perform the communicative illocutionary acts of expressing such attitudes. Why a speaker should do that is the hearer's problem, a problem that can arise only if the speaker is actually expressing certain attitudes that he could not possibly have.